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ABSTRACT 
 
Investor overreaction results in the systematic overshooting of stock prices and their subsequent 
mean reversion. International studies on the overreaction hypothesis generally find that the mean 
reversion of stock returns take place after a consistent winning or losing trek for over 36 months. 
We construct monthly-rebalanced prior 36-month winner and loser portfolios from global equities 
and examine their characteristics over the period from 1999 to 2009. Using the residual returns 
from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) 
as proxies for monthly abnormal returns, it is found that the loser portfolio accumulates abnormal 
returns mainly during turbulent times while the winner portfolio accumulates abnormal returns 
mainly during the upswing of the economic cycle. The resilient nature of the loser portfolio in the 
downswing of the economic cycle suggests that investments in past long-term losers could be 
regarded as a safe haven during financial market turmoil. In line with the prior study results 
conducted on South African stocks, the abnormal returns between the winner and loser portfolios 
are negatively correlated and the winner-loser spreads are found to be cyclical in relation to the 
economic cycle for global equities as investor sentiments and future prospects change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
nder the notion of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), asset prices accurately reflect their intrinsic 
value instantaneously as new information arrives to the marketplace. In the presence of investor 
overreaction, mean reversion is required to correct over- and under-stated asset prices in order to restore 
equilibrium. Empirical studies generally find mean reversion to occur for stocks that consistently outperform or 
underperform the market for a period of 36 months or longer.  
 
In an attempt to test the overreaction hypothesis on the JSE Securities Exchange for South African equities, 
Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) conclude that there exists specific market timing for mean reversion in relation to the 
South African economic cycle. More specifically, past long-term losers seem to outperform past long-term winners 
during turbulent times. Motivated by this insight, this paper tests the timing of the mean reversion for global equities 
in relation to the global economic cycle. 
 
We construct global winner and loser portfolios based on the prior 36-month returns of global equities and 
analyze their risk-adjusted performances over the period from 1999 to 2009. The two drastic market crashes over the 
examination period include the crash of the information technology (I.T.) bubble in early 2000s and the sub-prime 
crisis that led to the financial market crash in 2008. Observing the risk-return characteristics and the performances of 
the global winner and loser portfolios, along with the global economic cycle over this period, provides insights into 
the effects of changing investor sentiments and future prospects on the timing of mean reversion for global equities.  
 
The abnormal returns for the global winner and loser portfolios are measured as the regression residuals 
obtained from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993). 
Following the methodology of Hsieh and Hodnett (2011), we analyze the correlation matrix of the returns on the 
U 
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winner and loser portfolios. Their respective abnormal returns are then analyzed in order to detect the existence of 
specific timing for mean reversion in the global equity market. The time-series of the cumulative residual returns 
and the winner-loser spread are examined along with the global economic cycle in order to determine the timing of 
mean reversion for global equities over the examination period. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 De Bondt and Thaler (1985) propose the overreaction hypothesis, stating that investors overreact to the 
arrival of new information, which results in systematic overshooting of asset prices. The authors argue that investors 
often overweigh the most recent information and underweigh the long-term fundamentals. In the presence of 
investor overreaction, the mean reversion of asset prices must occur in a later stage in order to restore market 
equilibrium.  
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) test the overreaction hypothesis on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
over the period from 1933 to 1982. They form winner and loser portfolios based on their prior returns. Test results 
indicate that the loser portfolio constructed based on the prior 36-month returns outperforms the market proxy. On 
the other hand, the winner portfolio constructed based on the prior 36-month returns underperforms the market 
proxy. The degree of outperformance for the loser portfolio (measured by the average cumulative abnormal returns) 
is substantially greater than the degree of underperformance for the winner portfolio. The overreaction hypothesis is 
in direct contradiction to the EMH, which states that asset prices accurately reflect their intrinsic worth.  
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1987) re-evaluate the validity of the overreaction hypothesis by clarifying possible 
biases affecting test results such as market risk, firm size and seasonality. Test results support the results of their 
1985 study in that the phenomenon of mean reversion could not be explained by market risk and firm size. However, 
they find that abnormal returns in January and prior December seem to be negatively correlated. 
 
 Chan (1988) test the overreaction hypothesis on the NYSE over the period from 1933 to 1985. The author 
argues that abnormal returns for the winner and loser portfolios are attributable to the fact that the beta coefficient of 
the loser portfolio increases while the beta coefficient of the winner portfolio decreases after portfolio formation.  
 
Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) argue that firm size, beta and prior returns are generally interrelated 
and each of these effects on asset pricing cannot be examined in isolation. They analyze the abnormal returns for 
winners and losers on the NYSE over the period from 1931 and 1986. The results indicate that the degree of mean 
reversion is stronger for smaller firms as more established firms that are held mainly by institutional investors are 
less likely to be influenced by investor overreaction. Fama and French (1993) include the proxies for the small firm 
effect and the value effect, in addition to the market risk premium in the CAPM, in an attempt to explain portfolios 
formed based on empirical anomalies. They find that the abnormal returns of long-term winners and losers, among 
other anomalies, are explained by the 3-factor model for U.S. stocks over the period from 1963 to 1990. 
 
 International evidence on investor overreaction includes tests conducted by Schiereck, De Bondt and 
Weber (1999) who find that the loser portfolios formed by prior 36-, 48- and 60-month returns outperform the DAX 
index on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) over the period from 1961 to 1991; Forner and Marhuenda (2003) 
who find significant abnormal returns accumulated by the loser portfolio formed based on prior 60-month returns on 
the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period from 1963 to 1997; and Page and Way (1992) who find that the loser 
portfolio formed by prior 36-month returns outperform their winner counterpart for South African stocks listed on 
the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) over the period from 1974 to 1989. The results of Page and Way (1992) are later 
verified by Muller (1999) and Hsieh and Hodnett (2011). 
 
Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) argue that the timing of mean reversion could be cyclical and related to investor 
sentiments and future prospects of the economy. They form winner and loser portfolios based on 12-, 36- and 60-
month prior returns on the JSE over the examination period from 1993 to 2009. Test results suggest that the degree 
of mean reversion is strongest for the winner and loser portfolios formed based on prior 60-month returns. The 
correlation analysis indicates that although the winner and loser portfolio returns are positively correlated with each 
other, their abnormal returns are negatively correlated. This finding implies that the winner and loser portfolios 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2012 Volume 28, Number 3 
© 2012 The Clute Institute  293 
accumulate abnormal returns at different times. Using the loser-winner spread to indicate the profitability of a 
reverse relative strength strategy, the specific timing of mean reversion is determined along with the fluctuations in 
the South African economic cycle. More specifically, the authors find that the timing of mean reversion tends to be 
strongest immediately after the market crash. Test results also reveal that the loser portfolio is relatively more 
resilient during economic turmoil. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The Dow Jones (DJ) Sector Titans Composite Index is adopted as the research database in order to gain 
sufficient sector exposures in the global equity market. This database covers the top 30 stocks in terms of the U.S. 
dollar market capitalization in each of the 19 second tier sectors defined by the Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB). These sectors include automobiles and parts, banks, basic resources, chemicals, construction and materials, 
financial services, food and beverages, healthcare, industrial goods and services, insurance, media, oil and gas, 
personal and household goods, real estate, retail, technology, telecommunication, travel and leisure and utilities. 
Studies conducted on large global stocks partially mitigate the effect of survivorship bias in that large established 
firms are less likely to be non-survivors. 
 
The DJ Sector Titans Composite Index also offers sufficient coverage of global equities from both 
developed and developing markets, which include Australia, Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America (U.S.). 
 
 The historical total return indexes of the 570 constituents comprising the DJ Sector Titans Composite Index 
as of 30 June 2001 are downloaded from DataStream International database. The global winner and loser portfolios 
are constructed by selecting the top 50 stocks and the bottom 50 stocks based on their past 36-month returns 
calculated using Equation 1: 
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Where: 
 
R(36prior)i,t is the prior 36-month total return for stock i at the beginning of month t; and 
TRi,t-x  is the total return of stock i in month t – x. 
 
Calculating prior 36-month returns from the total return index takes into account both the capital 
appreciation of stock prices and dividend yield. The global winner and loser portfolios are rebalanced monthly at the 
beginning of each month over the examination period from 01 January 1999 to 31 December 2009. Adopting the 
argument of Hsieh and Hodnett (2011), the constituents of the global winner and loser portfolios are equally-
weighted to avoid the capitalization drag inherent in the capitalization-weighted index.
1
  
 
 Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) compute the monthly abnormal returns of the global winner and loser portfolios 
from their excess market returns. This approach assumes a constant market risk for all portfolios. We improve the 
accuracy of the abnormal return estimates by computing the monthly abnormal returns from the monthly residuals of 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) using the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index as the market proxy and the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill as the 
risk-free proxy. The CAPM and the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) are shown in Equation 2 and 
Equation 3 respectively: 
                                                 
1 Hsu (2006) argues that the cap-weighted index acquires overvalued stocks and sells undervalued stocks during portfolio 
rebalancing in the presence of investor overreaction. This is known as the capitalization drag in the portfolio. By constructing 
equally-weighted winner and loser portfolios from global equities, the capitalization drag is removed from the research. 
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Where: 
 
αP is the regression intercept representing consistent abnormal returns earned by portfolio P; 
rP,t is the return on portfolio P in month t; 
rf,t is the return on the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill in month t; 
rm,t is the U.S. dollar total return on the MSCI World Index in month t; 
βP is the beta coefficient of the regression measuring the sensitivity of portfolio P’s returns to movements in 
the market risk premium; and 
εP,t is the regression residual representing the abnormal return of portfolio P in month t. 
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Where: 
 
si is the sensitivity of portfolio P’s return to movements in the size risk premium SMB; and 
hi is the sensitivity of portfolio P’s return to movements in the value risk premium HML. 
  
The size risk factor, SMB, is estimated by the spread between the returns of the small and large firm 
portfolios. On the other hand, the value risk factor, HML, is computed from the spread between the returns of the 
high book-to-market and low book-to-market portfolios. The small and large firm portfolios are constructed by 
selecting the largest and the smallest 50 firms based on their market capitalization at the beginning of each month 
over the examination period. Similarly, the high and low book-to-market portfolios are constructed by selecting 50 
firms with the highest and the lowest book-to-market ratio at the beginning of each month over the examination 
period. These risk proxies are rebalanced monthly using the equal-weighting method. 
 
This approach takes into account the fact that the global winner and loser portfolios might have different 
degrees of sensitivity to movements in the market proxy (measured by the beta coefficient). If this was the case, the 
abnormal returns of the winner and loser portfolios calculated by subtracting the market return from the portfolio 
return would be biased. The scenario that the global winner and loser portfolios have different beta coefficients is 
quite probable since the rolling beta coefficients for the relative strength strategy fluctuates over time as suggested in 
the study conducted by Hsieh and Hodnett (2011). 
 
 The regression intercept αp, in Equation 2, known as Jensen’s alpha, measures the return that portfolio P 
earned in excess of its required rate of return implied by the CAPM. In addition to Jensen’s alpha, the global winner 
and loser portfolios are evaluated on a risk-adjusted returns basis using the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor measure as 
shown in Equation 4 and Equation 5 respectively: 
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Where: 
 
RP is the average monthly return on portfolio P; 
Rf is the average monthly return on the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill; 
σP is the monthly standard deviation of return on portfolio P; and 
βP is the beta coefficient obtained from Equation 2. 
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the risk-return characteristics of the global winner and loser portfolios and the MSCI 
World Index. The basic performance statistics are shown in Panel A and the risk-adjusted performance measures are 
shown in Panel B. The regression results for the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) is demonstrated in Panel 
C. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Both the winner and loser portfolios outperform the MSCI World Index 
over the examination period in terms of their average monthly returns in Panel A. The beta coefficients and the 
standard deviations of both winner and loser portfolios are substantially higher than that of the MSCI World Index 
over the examination period. The higher risk taking of the winner and loser portfolios are justified for the market 
risk in that both the winner and loser portfolios outperform the MSCI World Index in terms of all three risk-adjusted 
performance measures (refer to Panel B). The t-statistics for Jensen’s alpha of the winner and loser portfolios are 
both significant at a 5% level as shown in parentheses. 
 
When the performances of the global winner and loser portfolios are evaluated by the 3-factor model of 
Fama and French (1993), the intercept representing the size of the abnormal returns for the global winner portfolio 
remains statistically significant (refer to Panel C). An examination of the coefficients of the regression indicates that 
the returns of the global winner portfolio are positively correlated with the market risk premium and the small firm 
effect, but negatively correlated with the value effect. On the other hand, the abnormal return for the global loser 
portfolio becomes insignificant once the small firm effect and the value effect are accounted for. The returns for the 
global loser portfolio are positively correlated with the market risk premium, the small firm effect and the value 
effect. Overall, all the factors in the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) contribute to the explanation of the 
variations in the global winner and loser portfolio returns. However, the model fails to explain the abnormal returns 
earned by the global winner portfolio. 
 
 
Table 1:  Performance Statistics (1999 to 2009) 
Panel A       Basic Performance Statistics 
  MSCI World Winner Loser 
Return 0.31% 1.45% 1.87% 
Std. Deviation 4.90% 7.14% 8.35% 
Beta Coefficient 1.000 1.239 1.228 
     
Panel B       Risk-Adjusted Performance Statistics 
  MSCI World Winner Loser 
Sharpe Ratio 0.063 0.204 0.224 
Treynor Ratio 0.003 0.012 0.015 
Jensen's Alpha 0 0.009 -0.001 
   [3.208] [3.550] 
Panel C       Fama and French (1993) 3-Factor Model Regression Results 
  MSCI World Winner Loser 
Intercept --------------- 0.009 -0.001 
   [2.402] [-0.220] 
     
b_Market Risk Premium --------------- 1.239 1.228 
   [19.658] [20.927] 
     
b_SMB (Small Firm Effect) --------------- 0.775 0.330 
   [4.568] [2.089] 
     
b_HML (Value Effect) --------------- -0.950 0.803 
   [-6.823] [6.197] 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the time-series cumulative returns for the global winner and loser portfolios and the 
MSCI World Index. The examination of the cumulative returns for the MSCI Index (refer to the trend line marked 
by empty dots) defines the periods from January 2000 to December 2002 and from July 2007 to February 2009 as 
the downswings of the global economic cycle. On the other hand, the periods prior to January 2000, in-between 
January 2003 and June 2007 and after March 2009 are defined as the upswings of the global economic cycle.  
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An examination of the performance of the global winner portfolio reveals that the global winner portfolio 
moves in tandem with the MSCI World Index with substantially higher volatility. The global winner portfolio also 
accumulates returns much faster than the global loser portfolio (refer to the black trend line) during the upswing of 
the economic cycle. The global loser portfolio (refer to the black trend line) appears to be resilient after the crash of 
the I.T. bubble in 2000 with substantial initial rebound after 2002. The quick substantial recovery of the global loser 
portfolio in early 2009 is also noted. The relative strengths of the initial recoveries after financial market turmoil for 
the MSCI World Index and the global winner and loser portfolio are highlighted in the circled areas in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Performance of the Winner and Loser Portfolios (1999 to 2009) 
 
 
 The correlation matrix for the MSCI World Index, the global winner and loser portfolios and their 
respective residual returns is demonstrated in Table 2. Panel A of Table 2 displays the correlation coefficients 
between the MSCI World Index returns, the global winner portfolio returns and the global loser portfolio returns. 
The correlations of the residual returns between the respective portfolios based on the CAPM are demonstrated in 
Panel B of Table 2. The correlations of the residual returns between the respective portfolios based on the 3-factor 
model of Fama and French (1993) are demonstrated in Panel C of Table 2. 
 
Examining the correlation coefficients of the monthly returns displayed in Panel A indicates that both the 
returns of the global winner and loser portfolios are highly correlated with the MSCI World Index (0.83 and 0.81 
respectively). However, the correlation coefficient between the global winner and loser portfolio returns is only 
0.48. In line with the result of Hsieh and Hodnett (2011), the correlation coefficient between the global winner and 
loser residual returns is significantly negative in both Panel B and Panel C (-0.55 based on the CAPM residuals and -
0.52 based on the Fama and French residuals). This finding indicates that the global winner portfolio outperforms 
the market when the global loser portfolio underperforms the market and vice versa. Since the residual returns of the 
global winner and loser portfolios are derived from the regression residuals of the CAPM, they are not correlated 
with the returns of the MSCI World Index. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix (1999 to 2009) 
Panel A       Correlations Based on Returns 
  MSCI World Winner Loser 
MSCI World 1   
Winner  0.83 1  
Loser 0.81 0.48 1 
 
Panel B       Correlations Based on CAPM Residual Returns 
  MSCI World Winner Residual Loser Residual 
MSCI World 1   
Winner Residual  0.00 1  
Loser Residual 0.00 -0.55 1 
  
Panel C       Correlations Based on Fama and French (1993) 3-Factor Model Residual Returns 
  MSCI World Winner Residual Loser Residual 
MSCI World 1   
Winner Residual  0.00 1  
Loser Residual 0.00 -0.52 1 
     
 
The results of the risk-return characteristics, time-series performances and correlation matrices indicate that 
the global winner and loser portfolios perform differently during different stages of the global economic cycle, have 
different strengths of initial recoveries from global financial crises and outperform the market at different times. All 
these findings suggest that the timing of equity mean reversion in the global equity market is in line with global 
economic cycles as investor sentiment and future prospects change.  
 
Figure 2 depicts the mean reversion timing using the log winner-loser spread and the log cumulative 
residual returns of the global winner and loser portfolios based on the CAPM residuals over the examination period. 
The cumulative residual returns calculated based on the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) are illustrated in 
Figure 3. The negative correlation between the global winner and loser residual returns is reassured by examining 
the log cumulative residual returns of the two portfolios (refer to the trend lines).  
 
The global winner and loser portfolios almost accumulate residual returns (that is, outperform or 
underperform the market) in opposite directions at all times. The fact that the log cumulative winner-loser spread 
(refer to the histograms in Figure 2 and Figure 3) is consistently below zero highlights the two market crashes that 
impede the global equity market performances over the examination period, as the global loser portfolio outperforms 
the global winner portfolio mainly during turbulent times and in the initial recoveries from the market crash. 
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Figure 2:  The Timing of Mean Reversion and the Global Economic Cycle (1999 to 2009):   
       Analysis Based on the Residual Returns of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
 
 
Figure 3:  The Timing of Mean Reversion and the Global Economic Cycle (1999 to 2009):   
Analysis Based on the Residual Returns of the 3-Factor Model of Fama and French (1993) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 We constructed the global winner and loser portfolios based on prior 36-month returns over a 132-month 
period from 01 January 1999 to 31 December 2009. The fluctuations in the economic cycle is highlighted by the 
peak and the crash of the I.T. bubble in the early 2000s; the subsequent recovery and the upswing of the economic 
cycle from 2003 to mid-2007; the crash of the financial market in 2008 as a result of the sub-prime crisis; and the 
start of the recovery in early 2009. 
 
 The results of the performance statistics indicate that both winner and loser portfolios outperform the MSCI 
World Index on a risk-adjusted returns basis over the examination period. The risks associated with investing in the 
past long-term winners and losers are substantially higher than investments in average securities (in the market) in 
terms of both the standard deviation and beta coefficient measures. The fact that the beta coefficients for the global 
winner and loser portfolios are substantially higher than the market proxy and different from each other implies that 
abnormal returns calculated by simply subtracting the market return from the portfolio return is biased. This result 
supports the use of the residual returns computed from asset pricing models as proxies for abnormal returns and to 
take into account different degrees of sensitivity of the winner and loser portfolio returns to fluctuations in the 
market proxy returns.  
 
When the returns of the global winner and loser portfolios are regressed on the market risk premium alone 
based on the CAPM, both portfolios earn abnormal returns (proxied by Jensen’s alpha) that cannot be explained by 
the CAPM. When the proxies for the small firm effect and the value effect are added to the model, it is found that 
the abnormal returns earned by the global winner portfolio remains significant, but the abnormal returns for the 
global loser portfolio dissipates. This suggests that the abnormal returns to the global winner portfolio remains an 
efficient market anomaly after the value and size effects are considered as priced risks in the 3-factor model of Fama 
and French (1993). Overall, all three factors contribute to the explanation of the variations in the global winner and 
loser portfolio returns. While all three factors are positively correlated with the global loser portfolio returns, the 
returns on the global winner portfolio is found to be negatively correlated to the value effect. 
 
Although the global winner and loser portfolio returns are both strongly positively correlated with the 
MSCI World Index returns, the positive correlation between the global winner and loser portfolio returns is weak. 
The correlation coefficients between the global winner and loser portfolio residual returns computed from both the 
CAPM and the 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993) are significantly negative, indicating that the global 
winner and loser portfolios outperform the market at different times. This result is confirmed by examining the log 
cumulative residual returns of global winner and loser portfolios in that the two portfolios virtually accumulate 
residual returns in an opposite manner over the examination period. The log cumulative global winner-loser spread 
indicates that the global winner portfolio is outperformed by the global loser portfolio mainly during turbulent times 
and in the initial stage of the recovery phase after the financial market crises. 
 
 Overall, the study results are in support of the findings of Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) in that there exists a 
specific timing for the mean reversion of global winner and loser portfolios. The timing of mean reversion is found 
to be in line with changing investor sentiments and future prospects throughout the global economic cycle. The 
strength of the mean reversion is found to be strong during turbulent times when investors are fearful but weak when 
investor confidence is high. As a result, investments in prior long-term losers are resilient during financial market 
turmoil. In addition, investors seem to aggressively acquire long-term losers during the initial stage of the recovery 
from global financial crises. Built on this insight, we recommend that further research be conducted on the 
profitability of relative strength strategies. 
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